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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 04-3152
________________
CHARLES J. MANLEY,
                   Appellant
   v.
JOE MARAN; JEROME TAYLOR; MARC ANTHONY ARRIGO; STEVEN NEIL
WHITE; DAVID M. WEISSMAN; MICHAEL A. FORESTA; GERALD DUGAN;
MARK CAJETAN CAVANAUGH; ROY K. LISKO
________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-02504)
District Judge: Honorable William G. Bassler 
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 26, 2005
Before:    RENDELL, AMBRO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  May 25, 2005)
________________
OPINION
________________
PER CURIAM
Charles J. Manley, a student attending law school in Virginia, filed a suit pro se in
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against lawyers and law firms,
variously from Pennsylvania or New Jersey, that he had employed to represent him in a
2personal injury suit.  Because he claimed legal malpractice, he was required to provide an
affidavit of merit, or in the alternative, a sworn statement, in compliance with New Jersey
law.  On August 1, 2003, the District Court held that Manley had not satisfied the New
Jersey statutory requirement for suits against Gerald J. Dugan, Mark C. Cavanaugh, the
law firm of Dugan, Brinkman, Maginnis and Pace, David M. Weissman, Michael A.
Forresta, and the law firm of DuBois, Sheehan, Hamilton, and Levin, and dismissed
claims against these Defendants.  Soon thereafter, the District Court dismissed all claims
against Roy Lisko.  On December 3, 2003, Manley moved for reconsideration of the
August 1, 2003 order and for leave to file affidavits of merit nunc pro tunc.  In the
interim, Defendants Joe Maran, Jerome Taylor, the Law Offices of Jerome Taylor, Marc
Antony Arrigo, and Steven Neil White moved to dismiss the Complaint.  In an order
entered on June 25, 2004, after oral argument and for reasons noted on the record on June
22, 2004, the District Court denied Manley’s motion for reconsideration and motion for
leave to file affidavits of merit nunc pro tunc, and “because there [was] no just reason for
delay,” entered final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in favor
of Gerald J. Dugan, Mark C. Cavanaugh, the law firm of Dugan, Brinkman, Maginnis and
Pace, David M.Weissman, Michael A. Forresta, and the law firm of DuBois, Sheehan,
Hamilton, and Levin.  The District Court also granted the motion to dismiss of Jerome
Taylor, the Law Offices of Jerome Taylor, Marc Antony Arrigo, and Steven Neil White,
and “because there [was] no just reason for delay,” entered final judgment in their favor
as well.  The District Court also denied Joe Maran’s motion to dismiss.   Manley appeals
3the District Court’s orders of June 25, 2004. 
Manley’s appeal will be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the
District Court’s Rule 54(b) determinations were not proper.  Manley’s case involves
multiple claims and parties.  The issues on appeal, which relate to New Jersey’s statutory
requirements for litigants filing malpractice actions, are separate from those claims the
District Court had yet to adjudicate and are thus different from issues that would be
presented in any appeals that could be brought later.  However, an important unresolved
issue common to all Defendants undermines the District Court’s express determinations
that there was no just reason for delay.  Specifically, it is unclear if the District Court had
subject matter jurisdiction in diversity over Manley’s legal malpractice claims.  
Although there is some evidence of domicile in the record, such as Manley’s
mailing address in Virginia and his phone number with a Pennsylvania area code, it is not
sufficient to show whether Manley is a citizen or domiciliary of Virginia or Pennsylvania.
See Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 569 (1915).  It is also unclear whether Manley, an
adult law student in Virginia, is a student studying outside of his “home state.”  See
Shishko v. State Farm Ins. Co., 553 F. Supp. 308, 310-11 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 722 F.2d
734 (3d Cir. 1983); Blue v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 437 F. Supp. 715, 718
(W.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d, 601 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979); Bradley v. Zissimos, 721 F. Supp.
738, 739 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1989); 15 JEREMY C. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 102.37[6] (3d ed. 2004).  Because Manley’s citizenship is not established, the basis for
the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is in question.  The unresolved question of
4subject matter jurisdiction renders the Rule 54(b) certifications invalid; thus, we do not
have appellate jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
